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Abstract
We explore the e⁄ect of trade policy on productivity and welfare in the now standard model
of ￿rm-level heterogeneity and product di⁄erentiation with monopolistic competition. To obtain
sharp results, we restrict attention to an economy that takes as given the price of imports and
the demand schedules for its exports (a ￿small economy￿ ). We ￿rst establish that welfare can be
decomposed into four terms: productivity, terms of trade, variety and curvature, where the last
is a term that captures heterogeneity across varieties. We then show how a consumption subsidy,
an export tax, or an import tari⁄ allow our small economy to deal with two distortions that we
identify and thereby reach its ￿rst best allocation. We also show that an export subsidy generates
an increase in productivity, but given the negative joint e⁄ect on the other three terms (terms
of trade, variety, and curvature), welfare falls. In contrast, an import tari⁄ improves welfare in
spite of the fact that productivity falls.
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11 Introduction
Much attention has been devoted recently to the study of international trade when ￿rms di⁄er
in terms of productivity. A key contribution is Melitz (2003), which develops a model with ￿rm-
level heterogeneity, product di⁄erentiation, increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and ￿xed
as well as variable costs of trade.1 Although this has become one of the workhorse models in
international trade, little is known about the e⁄ects of trade policy in such a setting. In part,
this stems from the complexity of the model: trade policy a⁄ects welfare through its impact on
entry, variety, distortions associated with mark-ups, terms of trade, and home-market e⁄ects. In
this paper we make headway by restricting attention to a ￿small economy￿that takes as given the
unit costs of foreign exporters and the demand schedules for its exporters. We ￿nd sharp results
for the policies that allow the economy to reach its ￿rst best allocation and characterize the e⁄ects
of export subsidies and import tari⁄s on productivity and welfare.
The economy we consider su⁄ers from two distortions. First, consumers can buy imports at the
country￿ s opportunity cost (or international price) but must pay mark-ups on their purchases of
domestically produced varieties. This creates a distortion in the allocation of consumers￿expen-
ditures between foreign and domestic varieties: there is too little spending on domestic varieties
relative to the optimal allocation. We show that a consumption subsidy on domestically produced
varieties equal in size to the mark-up neutralizes the ￿rst distortion. This can also be accomplished
through an import tari⁄or an export tax of the appropriate magnitude. Second, there is a distortion
associated with the fact that an increase in imported varieties increases total consumer surplus,
but consumers do not take into account the e⁄ect of their spending on imports on the number of
imported varieties available for domestic consumption. As a result, the number of foreign varieties
available to domestic consumers is below the optimal level. This distortion can be neutralized by a
tax on the consumption of domestic varieties, an import subsidy, or an export subsidy.
Optimal values for consumption subsidies, tari⁄s, or export subsidies can be seen as the combi-
nation of the policies that deal with these two distortions. For example, we show that the optimal
tari⁄ is the product of the tari⁄ that neutralizes the mark-up distortion and the import subsidy
that neutralizes the consumer-surplus distortion. It turns out that the mark-up distortion prevails
over the consumption-surplus distortion, so the optimal allocation is attained by the application of
either a consumption subsidy, an import tari⁄, or an export tax.
We also use the model to analyze the e⁄ect of export subsidies and import tari⁄s on productiv-
ity and welfare. In models with heterogenous ￿rms, exporters are generally more productive than
domestically-oriented ￿rms, so it is conceivable that by reallocating resources from low productivity
to high productivity ￿rms, an export subsidy could increase aggregate productivity. This may be
the reasoning behind the claim that, by promoting exporting ￿rms rather than those oriented to the
domestic market, industrial policy in East-Asian countries was better (or at least less distortionary)
1See Bernard et. al. (2003) for an alternative formalization of ￿rm-level heterogeneity and international trade.
2than in Latin America. Indeed, we show that the positive productivity e⁄ect is present: an export
subsidy leads to a reallocation of resources from less productive ￿rms oriented to the domestic
market to exporters, and this increases overall productivity. Still, since the optimal policy entails
an export tax, an export subsidy decreases welfare. To understand why welfare falls in spite of the
increase in productivity, we show that welfare can be decomposed into four components: produc-
tivity, terms of trade, variety, and curvature, where the last is a term that captures heterogeneity
across varieties.2 The negative welfare e⁄ect of an export subsidy is associated with its impact on
the last three components.
A related paper is Flam and Helpman (1987), which studies the e⁄ectiveness of tari⁄s, export
subsidies, and other policies in a model with homogeneous ￿rms. In particular, they develop a model
of a small economy with a di⁄erentiated good sector (with increasing returns and monopolistic
competition) and a sector with constant returns and perfect competition. The existence of this
second sector leads to factor price equalization across countries, but it introduces a distortion
associated with a di⁄erence in the mark-ups across the two sectors.3 The authors show that a small
tari⁄ is always welfare improving, while the e⁄ect of an export subsidy is ambiguous. Our paper
follows Flam and Helpman (1987) in focusing on trade policy in a small economy with di⁄erentiated
goods and monopolistic competition, but adds ￿rm-level heterogeneity and endogenous imported
variety as in Melitz (2003). This last element is particularly important in our analysis because it
gives rise to the consumer subsidy distortion mentioned above. Additionally, there is an important
di⁄erence in the way we model a small economy: in Flam and Helpman (1987) ￿rms at Home do
not a⁄ect the expenditure level in the di⁄erentiated good sector abroad, but they can in￿ uence
the price index there. In our paper, a small economy is ￿small￿in all ways, since Home ￿rms have
no e⁄ect on both expenditures and the foreign price index. Moreover, we allow the wage to be
fully endogenous and a⁄ected by trade policy rather than pinning it down through the use of a
homogenous good sector.
Another paper related to ours is Baldwin and Forslid (2004), which studies the e⁄ects of a
decline in the variable and ￿xed costs of trade on welfare, variety, and productivity. They extend
the Melitz (2003) model by looking at two countries that may di⁄er in size and introducing a good
produced with constant returns to scale and traded at no cost. This last assumption serves to ￿x
the wage in both countries. In contrast, by focusing on a small country, we can explore how tari⁄s
(and not just trade costs) a⁄ect a fully endogenous wage and also characterize optimal policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out and the equilibrium conditions
2Note that although our economy is ￿small￿ , its exporters are ￿big￿and set prices. This implies that the terms of
trade are not ￿xed in this economy.
3Another paper that also deals with a mark-up distortion in the presence of ￿rm-level heterogeneity, is Bilbiie,
Ghironi and Melitz (2006). The authors study the equilibrium of a closed economy, in which there is a distortion
caused by the existence of a mark-up for di⁄erentiated consumption goods, while there is none for leisure. They show
that e¢ ciency can be restored if the government taxes leisure (or subsidizes labor supply) at a rate equal in size to
a mark-up charged by producers of di⁄erentiated goods. This is analogous to our result that an import tari⁄ or a
consumption subsidy neutralizes the mark-up distortion.
3are derived in Section 2. Section 3 shows that the ￿rst best allocation in the economy can be reached
through either a consumption subsidy, an export tax, or an import tari⁄. Section 4 explores the
e⁄ects of an export subsidy and an import tari⁄ on the economy. Section 5 concludes. The details
of the proofs are given in Appendix.
2 The Model
The model incorporates both export and consumption subsidies. Import tari⁄s can be modeled
similarly (see Appendix). Consider a small country with L identical agents. Each agent supplies
one unit of labor and spends his income on a continuum of domestic and imported goods indexed
by v and v0, respectively. Domestic and imported goods are consumed in quantities q(v) and qm (v0)
by each agent. Preferences are given by
U =
￿Z
v2￿
q(v)￿dv +
Z
v02￿m
qm(v0)￿dv0
￿1=￿
; 0 < ￿ < 1; (1)
where ￿ and ￿m are the sets of available domestic and imported varieties; respectively, and ￿ = 1
1￿￿
is the elasticity of substitution. We assume that there is a consumption subsidy 1￿￿ ￿ 0 for domestic
goods, so that consumers pay ￿p(v) given price p(v) charged by producers: De￿ne the price index
P by P1￿￿ =
R
v02￿m pm(v0)1￿￿dv0 +
R
v2￿ (￿p(v))
1￿￿ dv: Then the demand for any variety is:
q (v) = RP￿￿1 (￿p(v))
￿￿ and qm
￿
v0￿
= RP￿￿1 ￿
pm
￿
v0￿￿￿￿ ; (2)
where R denotes aggregate expenditure.
Labor is the only factor of production, which is used by a continuum of monopolistically com-
petitive heterogenous ￿rms. Each ￿rm pays a ￿xed cost wfe to enter the market, where w denotes
the wage in the economy. After paying this cost, it derives its productivity draw ’ according to the
cumulative distribution function G(’): To simplify the analysis, we assume that the productivity
distribution is Pareto, G(’) = 1 ￿
￿
b
’
￿￿
for ’ ￿ b; with ￿ > ￿:4
A ￿rm with productivity level ’ has a labor requirement f +
q
’ to produce q units of variety v
for the domestic market. Thus, it has a marginal cost w
’, and given the demand function from (2),
it charges a price w
￿’: Then the quantity sold domestically, the revenues, and pro￿ts from domestic
sales of a ￿rm with productivity ’ are, respectively,
qd (’) = RP￿￿1
￿
￿w
￿’
￿￿￿
; rd (’) = RP￿￿1￿￿￿
￿
w
￿’
￿1￿￿
; ￿d (’) =
rd (’)
￿
￿ wf: (3)
Foreign demand for domestic variety v is given by Apexp (v)
￿￿ ; where A is exogenously ￿xed
4Note that compared to the similar assumption of ￿ > ￿ ￿ 1 in Melitz (2003), we assume ￿ > ￿; which allows us
to calculate the aggregate quantities produced for the home and foreign markets.
4and pexp (v) is the price charged by an exporter. A ￿rm which decides to export must pay a ￿xed
cost wfexp to access the foreign market.5 Also, we assume that it receives an ad-valorem export
subsidy s > 1; calculated over export revenues, so that an exporter charging price pexp gets spexp
for each unit sold abroad.6 Thus, exporters maximize
￿exp (’) = sA(pexp)
1￿￿ ￿ (w=’)A(pexp)
￿￿ ￿ wfexp;
and charge price pexp (’) = w
s￿’: The quantity exported, the revenues, and pro￿ts from exporting
are, respectively,
qexp (’) = A
￿
w
￿s’
￿￿￿
; rexp (’) = As￿
￿
w
￿’
￿1￿￿
; ￿exp (’) =
rexp (’)
￿
￿ wfexp: (4)
Since all pro￿ts are increasing in ’; we can de￿ne two productivity cuto⁄s, x and y; for domestic
producers and exporters, respectively, so that only ￿rms with productivity above x produce for the
domestic market, and only ￿rms with productivity above y export. The conditions for these cuto⁄s
are derived from equalizing pro￿ts from each option to zero,
RP￿￿1￿￿￿
￿￿x
w
￿￿￿1
= ￿wf; (5)
(EXP) condition As￿w1￿￿ (￿y)
￿￿1 = ￿wfexp: (6)
We assume parameters are such that y > x, i.e., there are some ￿rms that do not export, which is
consistent with the empirical evidence. Speci￿cally, ￿rms with ’ 2 [b;x) exit without production,
￿rms with ’ 2 [x;y) produce only for the domestic market, and ￿rms with ’ 2 [y;1) produce for
both home and foreign markets. Thus, if Me is the mass of entrants and M is the mass of active
￿rms in the economy, then
(1 ￿ G(x))Me = M;
i.e., only the share (1 ￿ G(x)) of entrants survives.7 In addition, the mass of exporters is Mexp =
mexpM, where mexp ￿
1￿G(y)
1￿G(x) is the share of exporters among the whole population of active ￿rms
in the economy.
The production structure abroad is similar to that at Home: the productivity distribution of
foreign exporters is given by G(’) = 1 ￿
￿
b
’
￿￿
so that the foreign exporter with productivity
’ sets the price pm =
￿
￿’; where ￿ denotes the cost of an input bundle (here just labor) aug-
mented by the iceberg transport cost.8 Moreover, the foreign exporters have to pay ￿xed costs
5Introducing per-unit trade costs would not a⁄ect our results, so we chose to leave them out to simplify notation.
6Note that to model an export tax ￿, it is enough to assume that s < 1, so that ￿ = 1 ￿ s: All derivations are the
same for any value of s:
7Here we deviate from Melitz (2003) by considering a static model, where ￿rms enter, pro￿ts are realized, and
then all ￿rms exit in a single period.
8If the lower limit of the distribution of productivity for the rest of the world di⁄ers from that of the home country,
5of exporting denoted by Fexp. Under the assumption of a small economy, both ￿ and Fexp are
not a⁄ected by any changes in the home country. Moreover, under this assumption, a mass of all
available foreign varieties, MForeign; is also not a⁄ected by any changes at Home. However, only
some foreign ￿rms become exporters. In particular, if we denote by z the productivity level of a
marginal ￿rm, which is indi⁄erent between exporting and not, then the mass of foreign exporters
is Mm = (1 ￿ G(z))MForeign: To simplify the analysis, we normalize the mass of all available for-
eign varieties MForeign to 1: The level of z is determined from the zero pro￿t condition for foreign
exporters:
rm (z) = RP￿￿1
￿
￿
￿z
￿1￿￿
= ￿Fexp: (7)
Given the structure above, we can rewrite the price index at Home as
P1￿￿ = ￿Mm
￿
￿z
￿
￿￿￿1
+ ￿M
￿
￿x
￿w
￿￿￿1
; (8)
where ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿(￿￿1): Next, following Melitz (2003), we de￿ne ~ ’(x) =
￿R 1
x ’￿￿1￿(’)d’
￿1=(￿￿1) ;
where ￿(’) =
g(’)
1￿G(x) = ￿ x￿
’￿+1: Then the expected pro￿t from entering is given by
￿ ￿ = ￿d (~ ’(x)) + mexp￿exp (~ ’(y)) = wf (￿ ￿ 1) + wmexpfexp (￿ ￿ 1):
The free entry condition, ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ G(x)) = wfe; can then be written as
(FE) condition (￿ ￿ 1)x￿￿ [f + mexpfexp] =
fe
b￿: (9)
Now let us derive the trade balance condition. Total export revenues are
R
y (rexp (’)=s)M￿(’)d’ =
wfexpMexp￿￿=s; whereas the foreign international value of imports is
R
z rm (’)Mm￿(’)d’ =
FexpMm￿￿. The trade balance condition can then be rewritten as
(TB) condition MmFexp =
w
s
Mexpfexp: (10)
We also need to derive the formula for the mass of ￿rms in the economy. Note that the total
revenue obtained by domestic producers, M￿ (￿ ￿ + w(f + mexpfexp)), must be equal to wL:9 Thus,
(M) condition M =
L
￿￿(f + mexpfexp)
=
(￿ ￿ 1)b￿L
￿￿fe
x￿￿; (11)
b; this will not change our results.
9To prove, note that the total expenditure at Home is Rm + Rd = V + Rd = wL + T = wL ￿ (s ￿ 1)V ￿
1￿￿
￿ Rd;
where Rd and Rm are expenditures on the domestic and foreign goods, respectively, and V is the value of exports. This
implies sV + Rd=￿ = wL. Note that while consumers pay ￿p(’); a domestic producer with productivity ’ receives
only p(’): However, while foreign consumers pay pexp (’), exporters receive spexp (’): Thus, the total revenues of
domestic ￿rms are sV +
Rd
￿ ; which equals wL from above.
6where the last equality follows from the (FE) condition.
Finally, we want to simplify the zero pro￿t cuto⁄ condition for foreign exporters. Note that the
total expenditures are R = wL + T, where T is the value of lump sum transfers de￿ned as
T = ￿(s ￿ 1)
Z
y
rexp (’)
s
M￿(’)d’ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Z
x
rd (’)M￿(’)d’:
Normalizing L to 1, using (5) and (6), and some simpli￿cation, we obtain
R = w ￿ w￿￿M
￿
s ￿ 1
s
fexpmexp + (1 ￿ ￿)f
￿
: (12)
Using this expression and (8) in (7), we get (see Appendix):
(z) condition 1 = ￿￿M
"
fexpmexp + (1 ￿ ￿)f +
Fexp
w
￿
￿
￿
x
wz
￿￿￿1#
: (13)
Now we have our equilibrium system of equations (6), (9), (10), (11), and (13) with ￿ve unknown
variables, x; y; w, M; and z. We are interested in exploring how di⁄erent policies a⁄ect welfare,
which is captured by the utility of the representative consumer. To obtain a useful expression for
this utility, we ￿rst introduce some de￿nitions. Let Qd and Qm be the total quantity consumed of
domestic and imported goods, respectively,
Qd ￿ M
Z
x
q (’)￿(’)d’ = f (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
Mx; (14)
Qm ￿ Mm
Z
z
qm (’)￿(’)d’ =
Fexp
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
Mmz; (15)
and let Qconsumed ￿ Qm +Qd be the total quantity consumed of the imported and domestic goods.
Similarly, let Qexp be the total quantity of goods exported,
Qexp = M
Z
y
qexp (’)￿(’)d’ = fexp (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
Mexpy; (16)
and let Qproduced ￿ Qexp + Qd be the total quantity produced for both the domestic and foreign
markets. Then the utility per capita can be expressed as
U
L
=
Qproduced
L
Qconsumed
Qproduced
(Mt)
1
￿￿1 ￿
￿
"￿
Mm
Mt
￿1￿￿  
Qm
Qconsumed
Mm(
R
z q
￿
m(’)￿(’)d’)1=￿
Qm
!￿
+
￿
M
Mt
￿1￿￿  
Qd
Qconsumed
M(
R
x q￿(’)￿(’)d’)1=￿
Qd
!￿#1=￿
;
where Mt = M + Mm is the total variety consumed at Home.
The ￿rst component in the product above is the productivity index in the economy measured
7as total output per worker.10 Our productivity measure may seem problematic in that it appears to
be summing ￿apples and oranges￿ . But, in fact, we are adding up quantities that enter the utility
function in a symmetric way. So, to continue the metaphor, we are really adding apples of di⁄erent
colors. To see this, forget for a moment about foreign varieties and imagine that ￿raw quantities￿
of variety ￿, denoted by e q(￿), enter utility as
u =
￿Z
￿2￿
[￿(￿)e q(￿)]
￿ d￿
￿1=￿
:
Here ￿(￿) could be preference parameters, quality measures, or a way to deal with di⁄erent ways, in
which raw quantities e q(￿) could be measured. Let q(￿) ￿ ￿(￿)e q(￿) denote quantities in ￿e¢ ciency
units￿ . Note that q(￿) enters preferences symmetrically across all goods ￿, just as in (1).11 Since we
are adding up varieties that enter utility symmetrically, then in the present context our productivity
measure entails adding up e¢ ciency units, rather than adding up raw quantities (as in
R
￿2￿ e q(￿)d￿).
The important point is that our productivity measure is immune to unit changes. A change in units
would imply a di⁄erent function ￿(￿); but leaves q(￿) unchanged in the equilibrium.
The second component is the ratio of consumption to production, which is just a trade-adjusted
terms of trade (TOT) index. To see this, we can rewrite it as
TOT =
Qconsumed
Qproduced
=
Qd + Qm
Qd + Qexp
=
Pexp
Pm
￿￿
Qexp
Qd + Qexp
￿
=
￿
Qm
Qd + Qm
￿￿
; (17)
where Pexp = Rexp=Qexp and Pm = Rm=Qm: In other words, our TOT index takes into account ￿the
importance of trade￿in the economy: the ratio of the price of exports to the price of imports (the
traditional terms of trade ratio) is multiplied by the ratio of the export share in production to the
import share in consumption, which can be treated as a measure of the importance (in quantities)
of exports relative to imports. Note that if there is no trade, our TOT index equals 1:
The third component in the utility function is the familiar variety index, and the ￿nal compo-
nent is the curvature term, which includes both within and cross-country heterogeneity. To better
understand it, ￿rst note that since both countries have the same productivity distributions, then
M(
R
x q￿(’)￿(’)d’)1=￿
Qd
=
Mm(
R
z q
￿
m(’)￿(’)d’)1=￿
Qm
=
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿ 1
￿
< 1:
This term serves as a measure of heterogeneity among ￿rms within each country. As shown in
Appendix, it rises if the dispersion of productivity falls, i.e., if ￿ rises. And it converges to 1 as
￿ ! 1: In other words, for any value of ￿; this term becomes closer to 1 as ￿rms di⁄er less, and
10This de￿nition of productivity di⁄ers from that in Melitz (2003), who aims to capture ￿measured￿productivity.
In particular, he adds value added across ￿rms and divides this sum by the industry level price, whereas we sum up
value added across ￿rms dividing by the price, or (pq)=p = q.
11Let e ’(￿) denote the productivity of a producer of good ￿ in raw units. Then the labor productivity of good ￿ in
e¢ ciency units is ’(￿) ￿ ￿(￿)e ’(￿).
8it equals 1 if all ￿rms are identical. Moreover, if ￿ rises then this term rises as well and becomes
closer to 1; which re￿ ects the fact that, with higher elasticity of substitution, di⁄erences between
varieties and their prices matter less. The curvature term can now be rewritten as
"
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿ 1
￿
#
￿
"￿
Mm
Mt
￿1￿￿ ￿
Qm
Qconsumed
￿￿
+
￿
M
Mt
￿1￿￿ ￿
Qd
Qconsumed
￿￿#1=￿
:
The second component in the expression above re￿ ects cross country heterogeneity. To see this,
note that since each (domestic or foreign) variety enters the utility function symmetrically, in the
absence of any heterogeneity in prices within and across countries, households would consume the
same quantity of each good so that this term would be equal to 1.12
To sum up, there are 4 channels, through which any policy a⁄ects welfare in the economy:
U
L
= (Productivity Index) ￿ (TOT index) ￿ (Variety Index) ￿ (Curvature): (18)
3 The First Best Allocation
Now let us look at the social planner￿ s choice of the optimal policy.13 The social planner chooses
an allocation that maximizes (1) subject to full employment and balanced trade. Note that while
the social planner has full control over domestic ￿rms, this is not so with foreign ￿rms; she can
only choose the level of expenditures on the imported goods and in that way a⁄ect the variety
that foreigners will be willing to export. As shown in Appendix, if there exists a solution to this
problem, it is unique. Moreover, we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The ￿rst best outcome can be achieved through any one of the following policies:
￿ a consumption subsidy on domestically produced goods 1 ￿ ￿; where ￿ =
￿￿￿
￿ < 1;
￿ an export tax ￿ = 1 ￿ s; where s =
￿￿￿
￿ < 1;
￿ an import tari⁄ t =
￿
￿￿￿ > 1:
12The adjustment for curvature is independent of anything related to gains from variety. To see this clearly, imagine
the simplest model of a closed economy, where the mass of varieties is exogenous and equal to one, so that ￿ 2 [0;1]
and utility is captured by u =
￿R 1
0 q(￿)
￿d￿
￿1=￿
: If productivity is heterogenous, then we can write the decomposition
u =
Z 1
0
q(￿)d￿ ￿
 ￿Z 1
0
q(￿)
￿d￿
￿1=￿
=
Z 1
0
q(￿)d￿
!
:
The ￿rst term is productivity, while the second term is our adjustment for curvature. Even when there are no
variety gains, as in this simple example, our curvature adjustment is needed to convert our productivity measure into
something that matters for welfare.
13Here we look at the social planner, who maximizes welfare in the small economy only, not in the whole world.
9Moreover, any deviation from the optimal policy values reduces welfare monotonically.
Proof. The detailed proof can be found in Appendix. Here we provide a sketch of the proof. First,
we derive the system of ￿rst order conditions (F.O.C.s) for the social planner￿ s problem. We prove
the uniqueness of its solution by showing that if there exist two solutions then they coincide. We
next prove the su¢ ciency of the F.O.C.s by looking at the matrix of second derivatives evaluated
at the solution point.
Then we look at the market equilibrium outcomes in the presence of the policies mentioned in
this proposition and show that, for the appropriate Lagrangian multipliers in the social planner￿ s
problem, the system of F.O.C.s coincides with the market equilibrium conditions for each of the
three policies.
Finally, for each policy in the market equilibrium, we show directly that the ￿rst derivative
of the utility function is negative for any values below the optimal policy levels (for example, for
all consumption subsidies with ￿ < (￿ ￿ ￿)=￿), and it is positive above the optimal values. Thus,
the optimal value is the one, for which the ￿rst derivative equals zero, and any deviation from it
reduces welfare monotonically.
The intuition behind these results is the following. There are two distortions in the economy.
First, there is a domestic distortion created by the mark-up: domestic goods are sold at a price
above the opportunity cost, whereas imported goods are sold at a price equal to the opportunity
cost, so in the equilibrium there is too little consumption of domestic relative to foreign varieties.
This distortion is neutralized with a consumption subsidy that allows consumers to pay a price
equal to the producer￿ s marginal cost (￿ = ￿). Another way to neutralize this distortion is to set
an import tari⁄, which makes consumers pay the same ￿mark-up￿ 1
￿ on imported varieties as the
one they pay for domestic varieties (t = 1
￿). Alternatively, by taxing exports (s = ￿), the social
planner makes exporting less attractive to producers, so that resources are shifted toward domestic
production and the quantity of each consumed variety rises.14
The second distortion in the model is related to the fact that foreign producers generate an
increase in consumer surplus by their entry into the domestic market. Since consumers do not take
into account that their spending on imports increases entry by foreign producers, then the mass of
the imported varieties Mm is below its optimal value. This distortion can be neutralized by using
policies opposite to those in the previous case: now the social planner needs a consumption tax or
an export subsidy, ￿ = s =
￿￿￿
￿￿ ; or an import subsidy, t =
￿￿
￿￿￿.15
It is interesting to note that as ￿rms become less heterogenous (higher ￿) then the optimal
import subsidy increases (i.e., t =
￿￿
￿￿￿ falls). Intuitively, the gains from importing additional
varieties are larger if the marginal varieties are not too di⁄erent relative to the ones that are
14See Helpman (1990) for a discussion of the mark-up distortion in models with monopolistic competiton.
15These values for the di⁄erent policies can be formally derived as the optimal policies in a setting, in which the
domestic economy only produces a homogenous good under perfect competition, since in that case the mark-up
distortion is not present. Details are available upon request.
10already imported (see Arkolakis et. al., 2008). Also, note that with rising elasticity of substitution,
both the mark-up and consumer surplus distortions become less severe. The former distortion is
smaller since the market power of each ￿rm falls, and the latter distortion decreases because each
variety becomes less valuable, so the optimal import subsidy falls (i.e., t =
￿￿
￿￿￿ increases towards
1).
In the presence of both distortions in the economy, the optimal policy is a product of the two
policies needed to neutralize these distortions:
￿ = s = ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿
=
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
< 1 and t =
1
￿
￿
￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
=
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
> 1:
Note that in all cases the mark-up distortion dominates the consumer surplus distortion, so that
the resulting policies are a consumption subsidy, an export tax, and an import tari⁄.
To compare these policies with each other, note that while the ￿real￿values, namely, cuto⁄s x;
y; and z, and masses M; Mexp; and Mm; are the same in each case, the ￿nominal￿values, namely,
wage w, total revenues R; and price index P, can di⁄er:
wcs =
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
wexp = wm; Rcs = Rexp =
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
Rm; Pcs = Pexp =
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
Pm;
where ￿cs￿ , ￿exp￿ , and ￿m￿denote the consumption subsidy, the export tax, and the import tari⁄
cases, respectively.
First, note that the export tax leads to a lower wage compared with the consumption subsidy,
but the price index and total revenues are the same. The intuition is that the export tax reduces
the demand for labor, since exporting is not such an attractive option anymore, and as a result,
the wage is lower in this case. However, price indices are the same, since the prices of the imported
varieties are still the same, and the price of any domestic variety is low in both cases either because
of the consumption subsidy or the lower wage in the export tax case. The revenues are the same,
since in one case the revenues from the export tax compensate for the low labor payments, and in
the other case a higher wage compensates for losses due to ￿nancing of the consumption subsidy.
Second, wages are the same in the case of a consumption subsidy and an import tari⁄, however,
the price index and revenues are higher in the latter case. The explanation of the higher price index
is that consumers have to pay a mark-up on both domestic and imported varieties. However, they
have a higher income level thanks to the revenues from the import tari⁄, and this income allows
them to buy the same quantities of every variety as in the case of the consumption subsidy.
In addition, Proposition 1 leads to the following straightforward conclusion:
Corollary 1 In the presence of the optimal consumption subsidy, any trade policy results in welfare
losses.
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4.1 The E⁄ects of Export Subsidies
In this section, we assume that the government has in place the optimal consumption subsidy (i.e.,
￿ =
￿￿￿
￿ ) and explore how export subsidies a⁄ect the four major components of the utility function
in (18). Note from Corollary 1 that an introduction of the export subsidy worsens the equilibrium
outcome compared to the case with no subsidy at all.16 Moreover, we prove the following result:
Proposition 2 Welfare is monotonically decreasing in the level of the export subsidy.
Proof. In Proposition 1 we already proved this result in the absence of a consumption subsidy.
Now the proof is the same except that the optimal value of the subsidy is s = 1:
To understand better why increasing the export subsidy causes a welfare reduction, we look at
the components of the per capita utility function in (18). Before analyzing them, we ￿rst look at
the e⁄ect of the export subsidy on the basic variables in the economy.
Proposition 3 As the export subsidy increases, the productivity cuto⁄ for domestic producers rises,
the productivity cuto⁄s for Home and foreign exporters fall, the wage rises, the mass of entrants
remains unchanged, the mass of domestic producers falls, and the masses of Home and foreign
exporters increase.
The intuition behind the results is that an increasing export subsidy allows less productive
￿rms to export, so that the cuto⁄ for exporters falls and their mass increases, which leads to
similar changes in the characteristics of foreign exporters in order to keep trade balance. At the
same time, the demand for labor in the economy rises, which leads to a higher wage and makes
it harder to produce for the domestic market, so the cuto⁄ for domestic producers rises and their
mass falls. These two e⁄ects compensate each other so that there is no additional entry as a result.
Now let us look at the productivity index. From (14) and (16), productivity can be written as
Qproduced
L
=
Qd + Qexp
L
=
￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿ ￿ ￿
M
￿
f
L
x + mexp
fexp
L
y
￿
:
Using the (M) and (FE) conditions, we can rewrite it as
Qproduced
L
=
￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿￿(￿ ￿ ￿)
fe
(￿ ￿ 1)b￿
"
f + fexp
￿
x
y
￿￿￿1#
x￿+1: (19)
Since ￿ > ￿ > 1; and x and x
y rise with s, the productivity index rises as well:
16As also follows from Proposition 1, the export subsidy reduces welfare even in the absence of the consumption
subsidy, since the optimal policy is the export tax.
12Proposition 4 The productivity index is an increasing function of the export subsidy.
Intuitively, the increasing export subsidy raises the expected pro￿ts from exporting, thus, more
￿rms enter the market. Competition becomes more severe and only the most productive ￿rms
survive. As a result, labor is reallocated from less to more productive ￿rms, and productivity
increases, which is a standard selection e⁄ect.17 However, from Corollary 1 and Proposition 4
together, it is clear that welfare falls with the export subsidy because the other three components
in (18) together fall and more than compensate for the productivity increase. Moreover, it can be
shown numerically that depending on the parameters, each of these components can rise or fall
with s.18
Let us look now at the behavior of the TOT and variety indices closer. It is impossible to make
unambiguous predictions about the behavior of these two indices in general. The intuition for this is
the following. Consider the TOT index. The export subsidy a⁄ects the terms of trade through two
channels. The ￿rst is the intensive margin, i.e., the export subsidy allows the original exporters to
increase the quantity they sell abroad, and this leads to the standard negative e⁄ect on the terms of
trade.19 The second channel is along the extensive margin, as the export subsidy allows more ￿rms
to become exporters. As a result, the average productivity of exporters declines and this improves
the TOT. The net e⁄ect on the TOT is ambiguous.
Now consider the variety index. Since the higher export subsidy results in the exit of the least
e¢ cient producers, the mass of domestic varieties falls. However, imported variety rises. Thus, when
the costs of exporting are very high and, as a result, the economy imports few foreign varieties, an
increase in imported variety can more than compensate for the welfare losses arising from the fall
in the domestic variety, as consumers place a relatively high value on imported variety. As a result,
the variety index can rise.
4.2 The E⁄ects of Import Tari⁄s
From Proposition 1, we know that the import tari⁄ is an optimal policy in the presence of the two
distortions that we have identi￿ed in the economy. However, unlike the export subsidy, the import
tari⁄ reduces the productivity index. To see this, note that (19) again describes the relationship
between the productivity index and the productivity cuto⁄s for domestic producers and exporters,
x and y: Since a tari⁄ reduces x and increases y,20 the tari⁄ lowers productivity. The intuition for
this is that the tari⁄ shifts consumer spending away from imports and towards domestic varieties,
and this allows ￿rms with lower productivity levels to break even, also pulling resources away from
higher productivity exporters. Thus, as with an export subsidy, a tari⁄ has opposite e⁄ects on
17Note that the productivity index also rises with the export subsidy in the absence of the consumption subsidy.
18The details can be found in Appendix.
19It can be shown that the price set by the original exporters pexp (’) =
w
s￿’ falls since w=s falls with s.
20See Appendix for details.
13welfare and productivity.21
4.3 Trade Policies and Fixed Costs of Exporting
Why do the results derived above di⁄er from those in models with homogenous ￿rms and monop-
olistic competition? There are two key di⁄erences: ￿rm heterogeneity and ￿xed costs of exporting
for foreign ￿rms. These two elements imply that imported variety is endogenous, and this is what
gives rise to the CS distortion that makes the optimal policy in our setting di⁄er from the one
derived in Flam and Helpman (1987) and Helpman (1990), where imported variety is exogenous.
If Fexp converges to zero, then all foreign ￿rms become exporters (z = b) and the optimal tari⁄
becomes 1=￿.22 This is so even in the presence of ￿rm heterogeneity. This implies that heterogeneity
is necessary, but not su¢ cient for the optimal policy to be di⁄erent from the one in models with
homogenous ￿rms and monopolistic competition.
Similarly, non-zero ￿xed costs of exporting for foreign ￿rms are necessary, but not su¢ cient for
the optimal policy di⁄erences: as ￿ ! 1; i.e., ￿rms become less heterogenous, all foreign ￿rms
become exporters (z = b) even in the presence of non-zero ￿xed costs of exporting, Fexp > 0: The
intuition here is that for su¢ ciently high ￿; foreign ￿rms become so alike that if one of them can
earn non-negative pro￿ts from exporting to the home country, then all of them can do so.
5 Conclusion
Recent research has rightly paid much attention to the role of heterogeneity in productivity across
￿rms. In this paper we have analyzed the impact of this on optimal policy for a small economy
in the context of a Melitz-type model. We show that the existence of two distortions, namely, the
mark-up distortion and the consumer-surplus distortion, makes it desirable to establish a subsidy
on the consumption of domestic varieties, or alternatively an import tari⁄ or an export tax. We
also characterize how the size of these interventions depends on the degree of heterogeneity and the
elasticity of substitution across varieties.
A particularly interesting result concerns the e⁄ect of export subsidies. Trade models with
heterogenous ￿rms suggest that export subsidies can indeed increase productivity by inducing a
reallocation of labor from less to more productive ￿rms. We have shown in this paper that, with an
appropriate measure of productivity, this positive e⁄ect is in fact present, but is dominated by the
negative e⁄ects of the export subsidy on the other determinants of the country￿ s welfare (terms of
trade, variety, and curvature). Clearly, an exclusive focus on productivity can be counterproductive:
a broader analysis is necessary.
21A tari⁄ also has ambiguous e⁄ects on variety and the terms of trade index.
22Convergence from the optimal tari⁄
￿
￿￿￿ derived above (for z > b) to the optimal tari⁄ 1=￿ (for z = b) is
continuous.
14In our model the ￿rst best allocation can be achieved by either an import tari⁄, an export tax
or a subsidy to consumption of domestic varieties. The equivalence of these di⁄erent interventions is
due to the simple production structure in our model. For example, if there is also a good produced
under constant returns to scale and sold with no mark-up, then clearly the consumption of this
good should not be subsidized to achieve optimality. In this case, an import tari⁄ would no longer
be a ￿rst-best intervention. Instead, a subsidy on both imports and the consumption of domestic
varieties (sold with a mark-up) would be called for.
We have focused exclusively on a small economy. How do our results carry over to the case
of a large country? Such a country would face the same distortions as a small economy plus two
additional ones: the classical terms of trade distortion and the home-market e⁄ect. Since both
of these elements imply that a tari⁄ would increase the country￿ s welfare, we conjecture that
the optimal policy for a large country would also entail a tari⁄, an export tax, or a subsidy to
consumption of domestic varieties. It is important to emphasize, however, that the e⁄ect of all these
considerations (mark-up, consumer-surplus and terms of trade distortions, and the home-market
e⁄ect) on an individual country￿ s welfare are di⁄erent from their e⁄ect on worldwide e¢ ciency.
For example, although this has not been proven, we conjecture that a model with several identical
economies characterized as our small economy above would achieve full e¢ ciency under laissez
faire.23 Thus, the policies we have identi￿ed in this paper are not the ones that should be followed
to maximize worldwide e¢ ciency.
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166 Appendix
6.1 Derivation of (z) condition (formula (13) in the paper).
Using (8) and (TB) condition in (7), we get
R = ￿Fexp
￿
￿
￿z
￿￿￿1
P1￿￿ = ￿Fexp
￿
￿
￿z
￿￿￿1 "
￿Mm
￿
￿z
￿
￿￿￿1
+ ￿M
￿
￿x
￿w
￿￿￿1#
= ￿￿M
"
Fexp
Mm
M
+ Fexp
￿
￿x
￿wz
￿￿￿1#
= ￿￿M
"
w
s
mexpfexp + Fexp
￿
￿x
￿wz
￿￿￿1#
:
Finally, plugging (12) for R and dividing both parts by w, we get (z) condition
1 = ￿￿M
"
(s ￿ 1)
s
fexpmexp + (1 ￿ ￿)f +
1
s
mexpfexp +
Fexp
w
￿
￿x
￿wz
￿￿￿1#
: (20)
6.2 Curvature term
M(
R
x q￿(’)￿(’)d’)1=￿
Qd
=
M￿1=￿f (￿ ￿ 1)x
f (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
￿￿￿Mx
=
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿ ￿
￿￿1
: (21)
Similarly, Mm(
R
z q
￿
m(’)￿(’)d’)1=￿=Qm =
￿￿￿
￿
￿
￿
￿￿(￿￿1)
￿ 1
￿ : In the case of the Pareto distribu-
tion, G(’) = 1 ￿
￿
b
’
￿￿
; ’ > b; E (’) =
￿
￿￿1b and V ar(’) = b2 ￿
(￿￿2)(￿￿1)2: As a result, if ￿ rises,
the mean and dispersion fall, and if ￿ ! 1; then E (’) ! b; and V ar(’) ! 0: In other words,
an increase in ￿ reduces heterogeneity among ￿rms, and if ￿ ! 1; all ￿rms are identical. What
happens with (21) in both cases? It rises with ￿; since its derivative with respect to ￿ is positive:
￿
￿2
￿
￿
￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿ ￿
￿￿1
￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)￿
￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
￿
￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿ 1
￿￿1 ￿ ￿ 1
[￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)]
2 =
￿
￿
￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿ ￿
￿￿1+1 ￿
￿3 > 0;
and it converges to 1 as ￿ ! 1: Moreover, if ￿ rises, it falls (given that ￿ < ￿):
￿￿￿
￿
￿
￿
￿￿(￿￿1)
￿ ￿
￿￿1 =
￿
1 ￿ 1
￿￿(￿￿1)
￿￿
￿
￿￿(￿￿1)
￿ 1
￿￿1 ; where the ￿rst part falls. The second part falls as well, since 1
(￿￿1) ln
￿
￿
￿￿(￿￿1)
￿
falls with ￿: What happens if ￿ ! 1? In our model, we have a restriction ￿ > ￿: Thus, ￿ is always
bounded from above. And if ￿ ! 1; it means that ￿ ! 1; so that this term ! 1:
6.3 Proof of Proposition 1
6.3.1 Social Planner￿Problem and Its Solution.
Let q(’) be the quantity consumed of a good with productivity index ’ and let Q(’) be the quantity
produced. Then if all varieties v 2 ￿ are produced, it must be that q(v) with v 2 ￿ maximizes utility
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v2￿ q(v)￿dv s.t.
R 1
v2￿ [q(v)=’(v)]dv = K. This leads to the F.O.C. of q(v)=q(v0) = [’(v)=’(v0)]
￿.
On the other hand, if all varieties v 2 ￿ are exported, then it must be that Q(v)￿q(v) maximizes
export revenue
R 1
v2￿ a(Q(v) ￿ q(v))￿dv s.t.
R 1
v2￿ [(Q(v) ￿ q(v))=’(v)]dv = J. This leads to the
F.O.C.
Q(v)￿q(v)
Q(v0)￿q(v0) = [’(v)=’(v0)]
￿. Combining both results, we obtain Q(v)=Q(v0) = [’(v)=’(v0)]
￿.
Thus, an optimal allocation would necessarily have q(’) = ￿’￿ and Q(’) ￿ q(’) = ￿’￿, with
￿;￿ > 0 (for the appropriate levels of ’). Moreover, if a variety v with ’(v) is consumed (exported),
then all varieties with ’ > ’(v) must be consumed (exported).
In addition, if all imported varieties v 2 ￿m are consumed, then it must be that qm(v) with
v 2 ￿m maximizes utility
R 1
v2￿m qm(v)￿dv s.t.
R 1
v2￿m pm (v)qm(v)dv = Km, where Km is chosen
by social planner. Then qm(v)=qm(v0) = [pm(v0)=pm(v)]
￿ ; and a foreign exporter with productivity
’ sets a price pm (’) =
￿
￿’; where ￿ denotes the marginal costs of production abroad, so that
qm(v)=qm(v0) = [’(v)=’(v0)]
￿. Assume qm(’) = i’￿: If a variety v with ’(v) is imported, then all
varieties with ’ > ’(v) must be imported. Let us denote the lowest productivity of the exporters
by z, then it has to satisfy the zero pro￿t condition:
iz￿ ￿
￿z
= ￿Fexp; or i =
(￿ ￿ 1)Fexp
￿z￿￿1 :
Thus, we look for an allocation that maximizes welfare, has no goods produced for ’ < x,
exports only for goods with ’ > y, subject to full employment and balanced trade:
max
x;y;z;M
￿Z 1
z
qm(’)￿Mm￿(’)d’ +
Z 1
x
q(’)￿M￿(’)d’
￿
s.t.
Z 1
x
(f + q(’)=’)M￿(’)d’ +
Z 1
y
￿
fexp +
Q(’) ￿ q(’)
’
￿
M￿(’)d’ +
Mfe
1 ￿ G(x)
= 1;
Z 1
y
pexp (Q(’) ￿ q(’))M￿(’)d’ =
Z 1
z
pmqm(’)Mm￿(’)d’;
where Mm = 1 ￿ G(z): In addition, export revenues are (Q ￿ q)pexp. But Q ￿ q = Ap￿￿
exp implies
a(Q ￿ q)
￿1=￿ = pexp, where a = A1=￿. Hence, export revenues are a(Q ￿ q)
1￿1=￿ = a(Q ￿ q)
￿.
Also, recall that we assume the Pareto productivity distribution, G(’) = 1￿
￿
b
’
￿￿
: Thus, we have
max
x;y;z;M;￿;￿
￿
Mmv￿￿z￿￿1 + M￿￿￿x￿￿1￿
s.t.
M
￿
f + ￿￿x￿￿1 + mexpfexp + mexp￿￿y￿￿1 +
fe
b￿x￿
￿
= 1; and Mmv￿z￿￿1 = Mmexpa￿￿y￿￿1;
where mexp = (1 ￿ G(y))=(1 ￿ G(x)) = (x=y)
￿ : We can rewrite it as
max
x;y;z;M;￿;￿
￿￿
(￿ ￿ 1)Fexp
￿
￿￿
b￿z￿￿￿ + M￿￿x￿￿1
￿
s.t.
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￿
f + ￿￿x￿￿1 + mexpfexp + mexp￿￿y￿￿1 +
fe
b￿x￿
￿
= 1; and ￿Fexpb￿z￿￿ = Mmexpa￿￿y￿￿1;
The Lagrangian is then:
$ =
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)Fexp
￿
￿￿
b￿z￿￿￿ + M￿￿x￿￿1 + ￿
￿
Mmexpa￿￿y￿￿1 ￿ ￿Fexpb￿z￿￿
￿
￿￿
￿
Mf + M￿￿x￿￿1 + Mmexpfexp + Mmexp￿￿y￿￿1 +
Mfe
b￿ x￿ ￿ 1
￿
: (22)
This must be maximized with respect to z;x;y;￿;M. Letting h(v) = g(v)=[1 ￿ G(v)], then:
(z) : @$=@z = (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)Fexp
￿
￿￿
b￿z￿￿￿￿1 + ￿￿￿Fexpb￿z￿￿￿1 = 0; (23)
(x) : @$=@x = M￿￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)x￿￿2 ￿ ￿M (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿x￿￿2 ￿ ￿Mmexpfexph(x) ￿ ￿Mmexph(x)￿￿y￿￿1
￿ ￿Mfe
h(x)
1 ￿ G(x)
+ ￿Mmexph(x)a￿￿￿y￿￿1 = 0; (24)
(y) : @$=@y = ￿Mfexpmexph(y) + ￿Mmexph(y)￿￿y￿￿1 ￿ ￿Mmexp￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)y￿￿2
￿ ￿Mmexph(y)a￿￿￿y￿￿1 + ￿Mmexpa￿￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)y￿￿2 = 0; (25)
(￿) : @$=@￿ = M￿￿￿￿1￿x￿￿1 ￿ ￿M￿x￿￿1 = 0; (26)
(￿) : @$=@￿ = ￿￿Mmexp￿y￿￿1 + ￿Mmexpa￿￿￿￿1￿y￿￿1 = 0; (27)
(M) : @$=@M = ￿￿￿x￿￿1 ￿ ￿f ￿ ￿￿￿x￿￿1 ￿ ￿fexpmexp ￿ ￿mexp￿￿y￿￿1 ￿ ￿
fe
1 ￿ G(x)
+ ￿mexpa￿￿￿y￿￿1 = 0:
(28)
Note that ￿(￿ ￿ 1)v￿￿2 = (￿ ￿ 1)h(v)v￿￿1; hence, we have 8 equations with 8 unknown variables:
(z) :
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
z￿
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)Fexp
￿
￿￿
= ￿￿Fexp;
(x) : ￿(￿ ￿ 1)x￿￿1 ￿
￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿mexpfexp ￿ ￿mexp￿￿y￿￿1 ￿ ￿fe
1
1 ￿ G(x)
+ ￿mexpa￿￿￿y￿￿1 = 0;
(y) : ￿fexp + ￿￿￿y￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)y￿￿1 ￿ ￿a￿￿￿y￿￿1 + ￿a￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)y￿￿1
= ￿fexp + ￿￿y￿￿1 ￿ ￿a￿￿y￿￿1 = 0;
(￿) : ￿￿￿￿1 = ￿;
(￿) : ￿a￿￿￿￿1 = ￿;
(M) : ￿￿￿x￿￿1 ￿ ￿f ￿ ￿￿￿x￿￿1 ￿ ￿fexpmexp ￿ ￿mexp￿￿y￿￿1 ￿ ￿
fe
1 ￿ G(x)
+ ￿mexpa￿￿￿y￿￿1 = 0;
(FE) : 1 = Mf + M￿￿x￿￿1 + Mfexpmexp + Mmexp￿￿y￿￿1 +
Mfe
1 ￿ G(x)
;
(TB) : ￿Fexpb￿z￿￿ = Mmexpa￿￿y￿￿1:
19Moreover, subtracting (M) from (x) gives:
￿￿￿x￿￿1 + ￿￿x￿￿1 + ￿f = 0; or ￿￿x￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿x￿￿1 = ￿f:
From (￿), ￿ = ￿￿￿￿1: Thus, (x) is ￿x￿￿1 = ￿￿f: Similarly, using (￿) in (y) gives ￿y￿￿1 = ￿￿fexp:
Using new equations (x), (y), (￿), and (￿), we derive new (M) and (FE) conditions:
fe
1 ￿ G(x)
= ￿(￿￿f)
￿
1
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿ f ￿ fexpmexp + ￿mexp (￿￿fexp)
￿
1
￿
￿ 1
￿
= (￿ ￿ 1)(f + fmexp);
1 = M [f + ￿￿￿f + fexpmexp + mexp￿￿￿fexp + (￿ ￿ 1)(f + fmexp)] = ￿￿M (f + mexpfexp):
Thus, we have the following system of F.O.C.s in the social planner￿ s problem:
(z) :
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
z￿
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)Fexp
￿
￿￿
= ￿￿Fexp; (29)
(x) : ￿x￿￿1 = ￿￿f; (30)
(y) : ￿y￿￿1 = ￿￿fexp; (31)
(￿) : ￿￿￿￿1 = ￿; (32)
(￿) : ￿a￿￿￿￿1 = ￿; (33)
(M) :
fe
1 ￿ G(x)
= (￿ ￿ 1)(f + mexpfexp); (34)
(FE) : 1 = ￿￿M (f + mexpfexp); (35)
(TB) : ￿Fexpb￿z￿￿ = Mmexpa￿￿y￿￿1: (36)
Uniqueness of the Solution It can be shown that if there are 2 solutions, and both solu-
tions have at least one common component (for example, x1 = x2), then these solutions coincide.
We will prove that there should be a unique x, which solves the system, thus, if the solution
exists, it is unique. To do this, we will rewrite the system above till we have 1 equation with
1 unknown variable, which has a unique solution. First, let us exclude M. From (TB), M =
￿Fexpb￿z￿￿=
￿
mexpa￿￿￿y￿￿1￿
: M is used only in (FE), which together with (y) and (￿) can be
written as :
(FE) : 1 = ￿￿
￿Fexpb￿z￿￿ (f + mexpfexp)
mexpa￿￿y￿￿1 = ￿￿
Fexpb￿z￿￿ (f + mexpfexp)
mexpa￿￿￿1￿fexp
= ￿￿
Fexpb￿z￿￿ (f + mexpfexp)
mexpfexp￿=￿
=
￿
￿
￿￿
Fexpb￿z￿￿ (f + mexpfexp)
mexpfexp
:
20Let us exclude ￿ and ￿. From (z) and (￿): ￿ = 1
￿Fexp
￿￿￿
￿ z￿
￿
(￿￿1)Fexp
￿
￿￿
and ￿ = ￿￿￿￿1: Then,
(x) : ￿x￿￿1 = (￿ ￿ 1)f; (y) : ￿y￿￿1 = (￿ ￿ 1)fexp;
(￿) : z￿￿1a￿￿￿￿1 = ￿￿￿1; (M) :
fe
1 ￿ G(x)
= (￿ ￿ 1)(f + mexpfexp);
(FE) : 1 =
￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿
z (￿ ￿ 1)Fexp
￿
￿￿ 1
￿￿￿1￿
￿
b
z
￿￿ (f + mexpfexp)
mexpfexp
:
Let us exclude z. From (￿), (x), and (y), z = (a￿)
1
￿￿1 ￿
￿ = (a￿)
1
￿￿1 f
fexp
￿y
x
￿￿￿1 ; so we have now
(x) : ￿x￿￿1 = (￿ ￿ 1)f; (y) : ￿y￿￿1 = (￿ ￿ 1)fexp;
(M) :
fe
1 ￿ G(x)
= (￿ ￿ 1)(f + mexpfexp);
(FE) : Some constant = ￿1￿￿ (mexp)
(￿￿1)(1￿￿)
￿ f + mexpfexp
fexpmx
:
Let us exclude ￿ and ￿. From (x) and (y): ￿ =
(￿￿1)f
x￿￿1 and ￿ =
(￿￿1)fexp
y￿￿1 : Thus,
(M) : x =
￿
b￿(￿ ￿ 1)
fe
(f + mexpfexp)
￿1=￿
;
(FE) : Some constant = y￿￿ (mexp)
(￿￿1)(1￿￿)
￿ f + mexpfexp
fexpmx
; or
(FE) : Some constant = (mexp)
(￿￿1)(1￿￿)
￿
￿
f + mexpfexp
fexpmx
￿1￿
￿
￿
:
Note that equation (FE) can be rewritten as
(mexp)
(￿￿1)(1￿￿)
￿
￿
f
mexp
+ fexp
￿1￿
￿
￿
= Some exogenously given constant.
Then since ￿ > ￿ > 1 > ￿; the left-hand side of equation above is a decreasing function of
mexp. Thus, the equation above has a unique solution mexp. But from (M), it follows, that x is also
unique! Therefore, we proved that if the solution of the system of F.O.C.s exists, it is unique.
Su¢ ciency of F.O.C.s Let us rewrite the Lagrangian as
$ = U + H; where U =
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)Fexp
￿
￿￿
b￿z￿￿￿ + M￿￿￿x￿￿1 and H = (￿￿;￿)~ h;
21where ~ h is a vector of restrictions in our problem:
~ h =
 
Mf + M￿￿x￿￿1 + Mmexpfexp + Mmexp￿￿y￿￿1 +
Mfe
b￿ x￿ ￿ 1
Mmexpa￿￿y￿￿1 ￿ ￿Fexpb￿z￿￿
!
:
To prove the su¢ ciency of the ￿rst order conditions of the social planner￿ s problem described
above, we need to show that for any vector ~ ￿ such that24
~ ￿ 6= ~ 0 and r~ h(solution)~ ￿ = ~ 0; (37)
we have
~ ￿0$￿￿ (￿￿)~ ￿ < 0;
where $￿￿ (￿￿) is the matrix of second derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to ￿0 = (x;y;z;M;￿;￿),
evaluated at the solution point ￿￿. (See, for example, Theorem 3.3.2, p. 214 in Giorgi, Guerraggio
Thierfelder (2004), which states that if there exist such ￿ and ￿, for which the conditions above are
satis￿ed, then the solution we found is a point of global maximum of the objective function subject
to our restrictions. And we found such ￿ and ￿ already.) In order to do this, we can show that the
matrix of the second derivatives can be written as (see the proof below):
$￿￿ (￿￿) =
0
B B
B B
B B
B B
B
@
a11 0 0 0 0 0
0 a22 0 0 0 0
0 0 a33 0 0 0
0 0 0 a44 0 0
0 0 0 0 a55 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
1
C C
C C
C
C C
C C
A
;
where aii < 0 for any i 6= 6: Thus, ~ ￿0$￿￿ (￿￿)~ ￿ =
P5
i=1 aii￿2
i ￿ 0; so we need to show that
~ ￿0$￿￿ (￿￿)~ ￿ 6= 0: Note that the only way ~ ￿0$￿￿ (￿￿)~ ￿ = 0 is if ~ ￿0 = (0;0;0;0;0;￿6) and ￿6 6= 0:
However, in this case (37) is violated since r~ h(solution)~ ￿ = ~ 0 implies
h
@
@M
￿
Mf + M￿￿x￿￿1 + Mmexpfexp + Mmexp￿￿y￿￿1 +
Mfe
b￿ x￿ ￿ 1
￿i
￿6 = 0;
￿ @
@M
￿
Mmexpa￿￿y￿￿1 ￿ ￿Fexpb￿z￿￿￿￿
￿6 = 0; or
￿
f + ￿￿x￿￿1 + mexpfexp + mexp￿￿y￿￿1 +
fe
b￿x￿
￿
￿6 = 0; and
￿
mexpa￿￿y￿￿1￿
￿6 = 0;
which is clearly impossible, since in the second equation above, mexpa￿￿￿y￿￿1 6= 0 and ￿6 6= 0.
The derivation of $￿￿ (￿￿): Let denote the elements of $￿￿ (￿￿) by [aij]i;j=1;::;6 :
24In the expression below, r~ h(solution) is a matrix of the ￿rst derivatives of the vector of restrictions in our
problem with respect to ￿
0 = (z;x;y;￿;￿;M), evaluated at the solution point ￿
￿:
22Diagonal elements. First, note that
a11 =
@2$
@z2 = (￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1)
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)Fexp
￿
￿￿
b￿z￿￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿ (￿ + 1)￿Fexpb￿z￿￿￿2
= ￿￿Fexpb￿z￿￿￿2￿ (￿￿) < 0;
where the second equality follows from equation (z).
What we do in cases i = 2;3 is we take the derivatives and use the property that
@(xn)
@x =
n
x (xn): Then we use the corresponding condition to simplify the expression for the derivative and
compare it with 0: For example, since @ (mexph(x))=@x = @
￿
￿x￿￿1=y￿￿
=@x =
￿￿1
x mexph(x) and
@
￿
h(x)
1￿G(x)
￿
=@x = @
￿
￿x￿￿1￿
=@x =
￿￿1
x
h(x)
1￿G(x);
a22 =
@2$
@x2 = M￿￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 2)x￿￿3 ￿ ￿￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 2)x￿￿3
￿
￿ ￿ 1
x
￿
￿Mmexpfexph(x) ￿ ￿Mmexph(x)￿￿y￿￿1￿Mfe
h(x)
1 ￿ G(x)
+ ￿Mmexph(x)a￿￿￿y￿￿1
￿
:
We can use condition (x) to rewrite it as
a22 = M￿￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 2)x￿￿3￿￿￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 2)x￿￿3￿
￿ ￿ 1
x
￿
￿￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)x￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)x￿￿2￿
= M￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)x￿￿3 ￿
￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿
￿
[(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿]:
Note that since ￿￿￿￿1 = ￿ and ￿ < 1; then ￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿ > 0; while (￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿ < 0: Thus,
a22 < 0: Similarly, it can be shown that a33 = @2$
@y2 = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)M￿fexpmexph(y) 1
y < 0; a44 =
@2$
@￿2 = (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿￿2M￿￿x￿￿1 < 0; and a55 = @2$
@￿2 = (￿ ￿ 1)￿Mmexpa￿￿￿￿2￿y￿￿1 < 0; while
a66 = @2$
@M2 = @
@M
￿ @$
@M
￿
= 0:
O⁄-Diagonal elements. To derive the o⁄diagonal elements, we use Young￿ s theorem. As a result,
a12 = a21 =
@2$
@z@x
=
@
@x
￿
@$
@z
￿
=
@
@x
￿
￿z￿￿1 ￿ ￿
￿
= 0; and similarly;
a13 = a31 = a14 = a41 = a15 = a51 = a16 = a61 = 0:
a23 = a32 =
@
@x
￿
@$
@y
￿
=
￿
x
￿
@$
@y
￿
= 0; as
@mexp
@x
=
￿
x
mexp;
a24 = a42 =
@
@x
￿
@$
@￿
￿
=
￿ ￿ 1
x
￿
@$
@￿
￿
= 0; a25 = a52 =
@
@x
￿
@$
@￿
￿
=
￿
x
￿
@$
@￿
￿
= 0;
a26 = a62 =
@2$
@M@x
=
@
@M
￿
@$
@x
￿
=
1
M
￿
@$
@x
￿
= 0:
Using the same logic, it can be shown that all o⁄-diagonal elements of the matrix are zeros.
236.3.2 The Consumption Subsidy
The Optimal Value of Consumption Subsidy. We need to rewrite the equilibrium conditions
derived in Section 2 by setting s = 1 :
(EXP) condition A
￿￿y
w
￿￿￿1
= ￿wfexp; (38)
(FE) condition (￿ ￿ 1)x￿￿ [f + mexpfexp] =
fe
b￿; (39)
(TB) condition MmFexp = wMexpfexp; (40)
(M) condition M =
1
￿￿(f + mexpfexp)
=
(￿ ￿ 1)b￿
￿￿fe
x￿￿: (41)
(z) condition 1 = ￿￿M
"
fexpmexp + (1 ￿ ￿)f +
Fexp
w
￿
￿
￿
x
wz
￿￿￿1#
(42)
Now we are ready to prove that a consumption subsidy equal to 1 ￿ ￿; where ￿ =
￿￿￿
￿ ; results
in the maximal level of welfare.
Proof. Step 1. First, we prove that when ￿ rises, y and w must fall and x must rise. From
(EXP): w￿ =
A￿￿￿1
￿fexp
y￿￿1; (43)
y and w must move in the same direction, and from the (FE) condition, x and y move in the
opposite direction. Next,
(z) + (M) ) 1 =
1
(f + mexpfexp)
"
fexpmexp + (1 ￿ ￿)f +
Fexp
w
￿
￿
￿
x
wz
￿￿￿1#
; or
Fexp
w
￿
￿
￿
x
wz
￿￿￿1
= ￿f; or (44)
w￿ =
1
￿￿
Fexp
f
￿￿x
z
￿￿￿1
; (45)
where from (TB) condition, z￿1 = b￿1
￿
fexp
FexpwMexp
￿ 1
￿ _ w
1
￿y￿1 so that
w
￿￿ ￿￿1
￿ _
1
￿￿
￿
x
y
￿￿￿1
: (46)
Now, assume that if ￿ rises, then y rises and x falls. Then from (43), w _ y￿ must rise, but
from (46): w _
"
1
￿￿
￿
x
y
￿￿￿1# 1
￿￿￿￿1
￿
must fall (since ￿ > ￿).
24Our assumption led to the contradiction, thus, as ￿ rises, y and w must fall and x must increase.
Step 2. Note that from (z) condition,
Z 1
z
[qm(’)]
￿ Mm￿(’)d’ = Mm
￿
Fexp
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)
￿￿
z￿￿￿(￿￿1)￿
Z 1
z
’￿￿￿￿￿1d’ = Mm￿
￿
Fexp
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)z
￿￿
;
and
Z 1
x
[q(’)]
￿ M￿(’)d’ = M [f (￿ ￿ 1)]
￿ x￿￿￿(￿￿1)￿
Z 1
x
’￿￿￿￿￿1d’ = M￿[f (￿ ￿ 1)x]
￿ :
We want to rewrite
U￿ =
Z 1
z
[qm(’)]
￿ Mm￿(’)d’ +
Z 1
x
q(’)￿M￿(’)d’ = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)
￿
￿
Mm
￿
Fexp
￿
z
￿￿
+ M (fx)
￿
￿
as U￿ = d(￿)h(￿); where d(￿) ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ M (fx)
￿ falls faster than h(￿) ￿ Mm
M
￿
Fexpz
f￿x
￿￿
+ 1
rises, if ￿ >
￿￿￿
￿ , and vice verse if ￿ <
￿￿￿
￿ : In other words, the utility is maximal at ￿ =
￿￿￿
￿ !
First, note that x rises as ￿ rises, so we can rewrite both functions and look at their behavior
as functions of x: Then we can compare the elasticities of these two functions and show that
"d < 0 < "h: Moreover, if ￿ >
￿￿￿
￿
￿
￿ <
￿￿￿
￿
￿
; then j"dj > j"hj (j"dj < j"hj); so that d(x) falls
faster (slower) than h(x) rises, and U = d(x)h(x) falls (rises) as a result.
First, since ￿ < 1 < ￿; d(x) is decreasing in x:
d(x) = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ M (fx)
￿ = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ f￿
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)b￿
￿￿fe
￿
(x)
￿￿￿ ; and "d = ￿ ￿ ￿ < 0: (47)
Second, h(x) = Mm
M
￿
Fexpz
f￿x
￿￿
+ 1: Note that from the (TB) condition,
h(x) = wmx
fexp
Fexp
￿
Fexpz
f￿x
￿￿
+ 1:
Thus, h(x) = 1 + ￿(x); where from (43),
￿(x) = wmx
fexp
Fexp
￿
Fexpz
f￿x
￿￿
_ y￿
￿
x
y
￿￿ ￿z
x
￿￿
:
Moreover, since z￿1 _ w
1
￿y￿1 = y
￿
￿￿1; then ￿(x) _
￿
x
y
￿￿￿￿ ￿
y
1￿
￿
￿
￿￿
= x￿￿￿y
(￿￿￿)
￿
￿
￿￿1
￿
: Since
￿ > 1 > ￿ and y falls as x rises, then ￿(x); and in turn h(x); is increasing with x:
"h =
h0 (x)
h(x)
x =
￿0 (x)
1 + ￿(x)
x =
￿0 (x)
￿(x)
x
￿(x)
1 + ￿(x)
= "￿
￿(x)
1 + ￿(x)
:
25To calculate "￿; we use two properties: "a(x)b(x) = "a(x) + "b(x) and "a(b(x)) = "a(b)"b(x): Then,
"￿(x) = "x￿￿￿ + "
y
(￿￿￿)(
￿
￿ ￿1) = (￿ ￿ ￿) + (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
"y(x):
From the (FE) condition, "y(x) = ￿
f
fexp
￿y
x
￿￿ ; so that "￿(x) = (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
1 +
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿
￿
f
fexp
￿y
x
￿￿￿
;
"h = (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
1 +
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿
￿
f
fexp
￿y
x
￿￿￿
￿(x)
￿ + ￿(x)
> 0: (48)
Finally, we can compare the absolute values of elasticities from (47) and (48):
j"dj = ￿ ￿ ￿ versus j"hj = (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
1 +
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿
￿
f
fexp
￿y
x
￿￿￿
￿(x)
1 + ￿(x)
; or
1 versus
￿
1 +
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿
￿
f
fexp
￿y
x
￿￿￿
￿(x)
1 + ￿(x)
; or
1
￿(x)
versus
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿
￿
f
fexp
￿y
x
￿￿
; or
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
fexp
f
￿
x
y
￿￿ 1
￿(x)
versus 1: (49)
To compare the left-hand side with 1, we plug the expressions for ￿(x) and use (44):
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
fexp
f
￿
x
y
￿￿
wmx
fexp
Fexp
￿
Fexpz
f￿x
￿￿ =
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
Fexp
f
w
￿
Fexpz
f￿x
￿￿ =
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
Fexp
f
￿ 1
￿ ￿￿x
z
￿￿ 1
w
=
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
Fexp
f
￿ 1
￿ ￿￿x
z
￿￿ 1
1
￿
￿
Fexp
f
￿ 1
￿ ￿￿x
z
￿￿
=
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿:
Thus, the comparison in (49) results in comparing ￿ with
￿￿￿
￿ , and we proved our results.
First Best Allocation and Consumption Subsidy. As shown before, the market equilibrium
with a consumption subsidy ￿ =
￿￿￿
￿ satis￿es:
(M1) : RP￿￿1￿￿￿w￿￿ (￿x)
￿￿1 = ￿f; (M2) : Aw￿￿ (￿y)
￿￿1 = ￿fexp;
(M3) :
Z 1
z
rm(’)Mm￿(’)d’ = Mm￿
￿
Fexp
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)
￿
;
(M4) :
fe
1 ￿ G(x)
= (f + mexpfexp)(￿ ￿ 1); (M5) : M￿￿(f + mexpfexp) = 1;
where (P=w)1￿￿ = ￿Mm
￿
￿z
w￿
￿￿￿1
+ ￿M
￿
￿x
￿
￿￿￿1
; i.e., we have 5 equations with 5 unknown vari-
ables, R;w;x;y;M. If we have a market equilibrium and an optimal allocation (z0;x0;y0;￿;￿;M0;￿;￿);
which satis￿es the system of equations (29)-(36), is it the case that (x0;y0;z0;M0) = (xM;yM;zM;MM)?
26The ￿rst indication that this is the case is that equations (M) and (FE) in the optimal allocation
coincide with equations (M4) and (M5) in the market equilibrium.
One way to complete the answer (assuming the solutions are unique) is to postulate (x0;y0;z0;M0) =
(xM;yM;zM;MM) and then see if there exist (￿;￿;￿;￿) such that these together with (xM;yM;zM;MM)
satisfy 8 equations for an optimum allocation. This is exactly the case if:
￿ = RP￿￿1w￿￿￿￿; ￿ = Aw￿￿￿￿; ￿ =
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
R￿￿1P￿￿; ￿ = R￿￿1P￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
w; so that
(z) : ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
z￿
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)Fexp
￿
￿￿
=
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
R￿￿1P￿￿￿Fexp or RP￿￿1
￿
￿
￿z
￿1￿￿
= ￿Fexp;
(formula for import demand in ME),
(x) : RP￿￿1w￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿￿
￿￿x￿￿1 = ￿￿f or RP￿￿1￿￿￿
￿￿x
w
￿￿￿1
= ￿wf;
(zero pro￿t condition for domestic producers in ME, M1)
(y) : Aw￿￿￿￿y￿￿1 = ￿￿fexp or Aw1￿￿ (￿y)
￿￿1 = ￿wfexp;
(zero pro￿t condition for exporters in ME, M2)
(￿) : ￿
"
RP￿￿1w￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿￿
￿￿
#￿￿1
= R￿￿1P￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
w; is an identity.
(￿) :
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
R￿￿1P￿￿A1=￿￿
￿
Aw￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 = R￿￿1P￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
w is an identity.
(M) :
fe
1 ￿ G(x)
= (￿ ￿ 1)(f + mexpfexp); (free entry condition in ME, M4),
(FE) : 1 = ￿￿M (f + mexpfexp) or M =
1
￿￿(f + fexpmexp)
;
(the expression for the mass of active ￿rms in ME, M5)
(TB) : ￿Fexpb￿z￿￿ = Mmexpa￿￿y￿￿1 or MmFexp = wMexpfexp:
(trade balance condition in ME, M3)
276.3.3 The Export Tax
The Optimal Value of Export Tax. We want to show that the optimal value of s is
￿￿￿
￿ < 1:
The market equilibrium conditions are the same as those in Section 2 with ￿ = 1 :
(EXP) condition As￿w1￿￿ (￿y)
￿￿1 = ￿wfexp; (50)
(FE) condition (￿ ￿ 1)x￿￿ [f + mexpfexp] =
fe
b￿; (51)
(M) condition M =
1
￿￿(f + mexpfexp)
=
(￿ ￿ 1)b￿
￿￿fe
x￿￿; (52)
(TB) condition MmFexp =
w
s
Mexpfexp: (53)
(z) condition 1 = ￿￿M
￿
fexpmexp +
Fexp
w
￿
￿
x
wz
￿￿￿1￿
: (54)
Now we are ready to prove that s =
￿￿￿
￿ results in the maximal level of welfare.
Proof. Step 1. First, note that when s rises, y must fall and x must rise. The proof is the same
as in Section 6.3.2, with equations (43), (44), and (46) rewritten as
(EXP): w￿ =
A￿￿￿1
￿fexp
s￿y￿￿1;
Fexp
w
￿￿x
wz
￿￿￿1
= f; and w
￿￿ ￿￿1
￿ _
￿
x
y
￿￿￿1
: (55)
Step 2. This step is also the same as in Section 6.3.2 with ￿(x) = w
s mx
fexp
Fexp
￿
Fexpz
f￿x
￿￿
; and
when we need to compare
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
fexp
f
￿
x
y
￿￿ 1
￿(x)
versus 1;
from using (55) instead of (44) and the new ￿(x) function, we get:
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
fexp
f
￿
x
y
￿￿
w
s mx
fexp
Fexp
￿
Fexpz
f￿x
￿￿ =
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
Fexp
f
￿ 1
￿ ￿￿x
z
￿￿ s
w
=
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
Fexp
f
￿ 1
￿ ￿￿x
z
￿￿ s
￿
Fexp
f
￿ 1
￿ ￿￿x
z
￿￿
=
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
s: (56)
Thus, the comparison above results in comparing s with
￿￿￿
￿ , and we proved our results.
28First Best Allocation and Export Tax As in Section 6.3.2, it can be shown that the market
equilibrium conditions for s =
￿￿￿
￿ coincide with the system of equations (29)-(36), if
￿ = RP￿￿1
￿ ￿
w
￿￿
; ￿ = A
￿ ￿
w
￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿
; ￿ = R￿￿1P￿￿w; ￿ =
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
R￿￿1P￿￿:
6.3.4 The Import Tari⁄
The Optimal Value of Import Tari⁄. The derivations of the equilibrium conditions with the
import tari⁄ t are very similar to those in Section 2 with ￿ = 1 and s = 1: As a result, we have
(EXP) condition Aw1￿￿ (￿y)
￿￿1 = ￿wfexp; and (57)
(FE) condition (￿ ￿ 1)x￿￿ [f + mexpfexp] = fe=b￿: (58)
(TB) condition MmFexp = wMexpfexp:
We need to derive the zero pro￿t condition for exporters. The demand for the foreign variety v
is qm (v) = RP￿￿1 (tpm (v))
￿￿ : The expenditures in the economy are R = w + T; where T is:
T = Mm
Z
z
(t ￿ 1)
t
[tp(’)]qm (’)￿(’)d’ = (t ￿ 1)
￿
RP￿￿1t￿￿￿
￿Mm
￿
￿z
￿
￿￿￿1
;
where P1￿￿ = ￿
￿
Mm
￿
￿z
￿t
￿￿￿1
+ M
￿￿x
w
￿￿￿1
￿
: Then R = w
1￿ t￿1
t P￿￿1￿Mm
￿
￿z
￿t
￿￿￿1; and the new (z)
condition can be written as
RP￿￿11
t
￿
￿z
￿t
￿￿￿1
= ￿Fexp ()
w1
t
￿
￿z
￿t
￿￿￿1
P1￿￿ ￿ t￿1
t ￿Mm
￿
￿z
￿t
￿￿￿1 = ￿Fexp;
or
w
￿￿Fexp
= Mm + Mt￿
￿￿x
wz
￿￿￿1
;
or using the (TB) condition,
(z) condition
w
￿￿Fexp
= Mx
wfexp
Fexp
+ Mt￿
￿￿x
wz
￿￿￿1
:
Finally,
(M) condition: M =
1
￿￿(f + mexpfexp)
=
(￿ ￿ 1)b￿
￿￿fe
x￿￿: (59)
Now we are ready to prove that an import tari⁄ t =
￿
￿￿￿ maximizes welfare.
Proof. Step 1. First, we prove that when t rises, x falls, while y and w rise.
From the (FE) condition, x and y must move in the opposite direction. Assume that y falls.
29Then x rises and from
(EXP):
w￿
y￿￿1 =
A￿￿￿1
￿fexp
; (60)
w must fall. On the other hand, from
(z) + (M) )
w
Fexp
=
1
f + mexpfexp
￿
mexp
wfexp
Fexp
+ t￿
￿￿x
wz
￿￿￿1￿
; or
w
Fexp
=
w
Fexp
+
1
f + mexpfexp
￿
t￿
￿￿x
wz
￿￿￿1
￿
wf
Fexp
￿
; or (61)
t￿
￿￿x
wz
￿￿￿1
=
wf
Fexp
or w￿ = t￿Fexp
f
￿￿x
z
￿￿￿1
:
Again, from (TB) condition, z￿1 =
￿
fexp
FexpwMexp
￿ 1
￿ _ w
1
￿y￿1 so that
w _
"
t￿
￿
x
y
￿￿￿1# 1
￿￿￿￿1
￿
; (62)
and from (62), w rises, which contradicts to the previous conclusion about w. Thus, we proved that
y cannot fall with an increase in t, and as t rises, y and w rise as well, and x falls.
Step 2. Now we are ready to derive the optimal import tari⁄. Note that
U￿ =
Z 1
z
[qm(’)]
￿ Mm￿(’)d’ +
Z 1
x
q(’)￿M￿(’)d’ = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)
￿
￿
Mm
￿
Fexp
￿
z
￿￿
+ M (fx)
￿
￿
We will show that U￿ = d(x)h(x); where as x rises, d(x) ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ M (fx)
￿ falls faster than
h(x) ￿ Mm
M
￿
Fexpz
f￿x
￿￿
+ 1 rises, if t <
￿
￿￿￿; and the opposite happens, if t >
￿
￿￿￿: In other words,
U (x) falls with x; if t <
￿
￿￿￿, and it rises with x; if t >
￿
￿￿￿: Then since dx=dt < 0;
dU
dt
=
dU
dx
dx
dt
=
￿> 0; if t <
￿
￿￿￿;
< 0; if t >
￿
￿￿￿;
and the utility reaches its maximum, when t =
￿
￿￿￿.
We can compare the elasticities of d(x) and h(x) and show that "d > 0 > "h: Thus, the
behavior of U￿ = d(x)h(x) depends on the comparison of absolute terms j"dj and j"hj. First, note
that "d(x) = ￿ ￿ ￿ < 0: In addition, from the (TB) condition,
h(x) = wmx
fexp
Fexp
￿
Fexpz
f￿x
￿￿
+ 1 = ￿(x) + 1;
30where from w / y￿ and z￿1 _ w
1
￿y￿1;
￿(x) = wmx
fexp
Fexp
￿
Fexpz
f￿x
￿￿
_
￿
x
y
￿￿￿￿ ￿
y
1￿
￿
￿
￿￿
= x￿￿￿y
(￿￿￿)
￿
￿
￿￿1
￿
; and
"h(x) =
h0 (x)
h(x)
x =
￿0 (x)
1 + ￿(x)
x =
￿0 (x)
￿(x)
x
￿(x)
1 + ￿(x)
= "￿(x)
￿(x)
1 + ￿(x)
;
where "￿(x) = (￿ ￿ ￿) + (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
"y(x); and
"h = (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
1 +
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿
￿
f
fexp
￿y
x
￿￿￿
￿(x)
￿ + ￿(x)
> 0:
Finally, we can compare the absolute values of elasticities:
j"dj = ￿ ￿ ￿ versus j"hj = (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
1 +
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿
￿
f
fexp
￿y
x
￿￿￿
￿(x)
1 + ￿(x)
; or
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
fexp
f
￿
x
y
￿￿ 1
￿(x)
versus 1:
To compare the left-hand side with 1, we plug the expressions for ￿(x) and use w￿ = t￿ Fexp
f
￿￿x
z
￿￿￿1 :
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
fexp
f
￿
x
y
￿￿
wmx
fexp
Fexp
￿
Fexpz
f￿x
￿￿ =
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
Fexp
f
￿ 1
￿ ￿￿x
z
￿￿ 1
w
=
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
1
t
: (63)
Thus, we proved our results.
First Best Allocation and Import Tari⁄ As in Section 6.3.2, it can be shown that the market
equilibrium conditions for t =
￿
￿￿￿ coincide with system of equations (29)-(36), if
￿ = RP￿￿1
￿ ￿
w
￿￿
; ￿ = A
￿ ￿
w
￿￿
; ￿ = R￿￿1P￿￿w; ￿ = R￿￿1P￿￿:
6.4 Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
The market equilibrium conditions for the case of the export subsidy in the presence of the con-
sumption subsidy are derived in Section 3. Hereafter, we assume that the government has in place
the optimal consumption subsidy (i.e., ￿ =
￿￿￿
￿ ) and explore how export subsidies a⁄ect the three
components of the utility function by ￿rst proving Proposition 2 and then proving Proposition 3.
Proof. The proofs for Propositions 2 and 3 are the same as in Section 6.3.3 with the comparison
of "h(x) and "d(x) resulting in the comparison s R 1.
316.5 Quantitative Exercise for Three Components of Utility Function
We want to study the behavior of TOT and variety indices ￿rst. We show below that anything is
possible, i.e., there are 3 cases: (Which case happens depends on the parameters.)
(1) TOT index falls, Variety index falls;
This happens if we set the parameters:
￿ = 4; ￿ = 3:8; b = 1;
fexp
f
= 15000;
Fexp
f
= 1500;
fe
f
= 0:3;
A
f
= 200000;
L
f
= 0:5;
and vary s between 0:3 and 2:7: Then ￿ > ￿; y > x > b; Me > 0; wage > 0; and both indices fall.
(2) TOT index falls, Variety index rises;
Compared to case (1), the only parameters needed to be changed to get such behavior of indices
are
fexp
f = 150000 and
Fexp
f = 1:5:
(3) TOT index rises, Variety index falls;
Again, compared to case (1), we change only 2 parameters: now
fexp
f = 15 and
Fexp
f = 15000:
Finally, note that in the second case it can be shown that the curvature ￿rst falls and then
starts to rise, so its behavior with respect to export subsidy is ambiguous as well.
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